### Tech Platform Governance: Navigating the Future of Digital (Non-)Regulation

#### Dr. Anna Mysyshyn

PhD in Law | Co-Founder & Director, Institute of Innovative Governance | Expert in Al Regulation, Cybersecurity, and Digital Governance





### Kyiv mayor imposter uses 'deep fake' tech to fool European mayors

BY AGENCIES | JUN 25, 2022 - 6:41 PM GMT+3 |







#### Ірина Василівна

#### 7 год · 🕄

Я захищаю Вас! Побажайте мені удачі!





27

5 коментарів

### UK's Cameron hoaxed by Poroshenko impersonator

British foreign secretary became suspicious on call with man pretending to be ex-Ukrainian president.

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Politics

#### A fake recording of a candidate saying he'd rigged the election went viral. Experts say it's only the beginning

By <u>Curt Devine</u>, <u>Donie O'Sullivan</u> and <u>Sean Lyngaas</u>, CNN

Updated 6:09 AM EST, Thu February 1, 2024



04:20 - Source: CNN

A candidate targeted by a deepfake has an AI warning for America



## Disinformation Across Platforms

#### Telegram: The 'Grey Zone'

C

Semi-private broadcasting with minimal moderation. Pro-Kremlin military bloggers shape battlefield narratives and manipulate morale.

#### Facebook: Narrative Laundering

Fake pages and groups pretend to be local news. Disinformation hides in memes to evade detection.

#### TikTok: Emotional Targeting

Uses emotional visuals to influence perception. Shows fake "normal life" in occupied territories.

#### X: Botnet Coordination

Hashtag hijacking campaigns dominate trending topics. Bot networks amplify misleading "expert" content.



### Hashtags in Social media

Russian disinformation campaigns use emotional narratives spread through hashtags to undermine Ukrainian morale and trust:



### Corruption among members of parliament

Content highlighting instances of corruption—whether real, exaggerated, or entirely fabricated. The goal is to evoke a sense of injustice in the viewer and provoke the thought: "What are we fighting for?" This narrative is then unwittingly picked up by bloggers, who spread the message that "everyone steals," eroding trust in authorities.



#### Forced mobilization

Al-generated stories that instill a sense of fear, doom, and injustice in the viewer. The protagonist, often depicted as an ordinary citizen, is shown being forced into military service. This is designed to create anxiety and resistance among the population, making it more susceptible to anti-government sentiments.



#### Bribe-taking commanders

Content depicting military leaders as corrupt and indifferent to the plight of ordinary soldiers. Posts under hashtags like #ukraine, #mobilization, and #corruption amplify these messages, spreading the idea that the military leadership is detached from and exploiting the people, creating division and demoralizing the public.

### Ukrainians' trust in local media had decreased dramatically from 57% to 29% over the previous year.

The effectiveness of deepfakes varies across different sociopolitical contexts. In highly polarized environments with a low level of trust in the media like Ukraine, where the war has already strained public trust and increased vulnerability to disinformation, they can be especially impactful. And where the stakes are high due to ongoing war, deepfakes are also more likely to achieve their intended effects.



Platform	Key Threat	Action Needed
Telegram	Anonymous war disinfo + fake gov posts	In-app verification + cooperation with CCD
Facebook	CIB, comment brigading	Transparent takedown metrics + language support
TikTok	Emotional propaganda, aesthetic disinfo	Impact audits + counter-influencer networks
X (Twitter)	Hashtag hijacks, OSINT discrediting	Network disruption + journalist protections
YouTube	Long-form pseudo-history, fake experts	Pre-bunking, regional content labelling

### How AI Can Be Effectively Used



#### Detecting Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior

Al analyzes patterns in post timing, duplication, velocity, and bot-like behavior across platforms.

Tools used in Ukraine: Mantis Analytics maps networked disinfo narratives, while Osavul flags coordinated bot activity and Al-generated propaganda.



#### Multimodal Content Analysis

Al systems now analyze text (GPTgenerated propaganda), images (repurposed war photos), and video/audio (deepfakes, cloned voices).

Ukraine's Let's Data has helped uncover manipulated visuals claiming to show "Ukrainian troops abandoning cities" actually footage from years ago.



#### Prebunking and Threat Forecasting

Al anticipates disinformation themes by analyzing trends, keyword spikes, or bot activity before narratives go viral.

Before the Kherson dam explosion, Mantis detected increased mentions of "Ukrainian terrorism" in Russian Telegram channels — helping prepare counternarratives.

### AI Solutions for Disinformation



Success requires explainable AI, cultural localization, and graduated responses that flag rather than delete content.



### **Impact on Public Opinion**



#### Reconstruction Narratives

Russian TikTok videos show "reconstruction" in occupied Mariupol. Clean buildings and reopened schools normalize illegal occupation.

#### Eroding Trust

Claims that "Western aid is being stolen" weaken public support. Nearly 40% in frontline regions believe reconstruction benefits only elites.



#### International Opinion

Disinformation targets foreign donors with claims of corruption. This damages Ukraine's image as a reliable partner.





@chanpasadopolska 1 year ago (edited)

I think Russia take extra effort to make this city great because not only people in Mariupol but from other destroyed towns/villages need accomodation and Mariupol is the best city to make example of that Russia actually care for the people, also I'm sure that Russia has economical plan for Mariupol



# Disinformation Themes and Their Impact on Public Opinion









"Western aid = exploitation" Distrust in donors and government

"Occupied areas are rebuilding under Russia" Legitimisation of occupation "Leaders are corrupt and self-serving"

Apathy and civic disengagement

"Peace is the only option"

Premature pressure for concessions



"Military resistance is futile"

Lower mobilisation and morale

### Russia's AI-Driven Propaganda Machine

Russia no longer needs to train propagandists in Lumumba University — Al-driven **botfarms** now do the job, creating the illusion of global support for Russia.



#### AI-Driven Botfarms

Networks of fake and rented accounts flood social media with Kremlin narratives, creating the appearance of widespread support for Russian positions.



## Dual Approach to Disinformation

Automated bots amplify propaganda through mass posting and engagement. Human-controlled accounts—often from African and Asian regions—spread disinformation for pay.



#### The Prigozhin Connection

At the start of the full-scale invasion, **Prigozhin-linked structures** reportedly created thousands of Twitter/X accounts — some fully automated, others real people "renting out" their profiles causing a surge in pro-Russian messages from seemingly neutral voices.

### Ukraine's Counter-Disinformation Strategy

#### What Works

- Centralized coordination through CCD
- Al partnerships for detection at scale
- Strategic digital communication by leaders
- Strong civic fact-checking ecosystem

#### Gaps to Address

- No unified legal framework
- Limited transparency in government operations
- Underinvestment in media literacy
- Weak regulation of Telegram and TikTok

# Ukrainian Resources on Disinformation and Strategic Communication

Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) – Official Website Ukraine's primary institution for monitoring and countering disinformation, operating under the National Security and Defense Council. Shifting https://cpd.gov.ua/en/

Mysyshyn Anna (2024). Advanced Technologies in the War in Ukraine: Risks for Democracy and Human Rights. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Al in Information Warfare (page 14)

<u>https://www.gmfus.org/news/advanced-technologies-war-ukraine-risks-democracy-and-human-rights</u>

Institute of Innovative Governance A guide for content creators to identify and counter Russian propaganda in the latest technologies & <a href="https://ai.instingov.org/en/guide">https://ai.instingov.org/en/guide</a>

National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) Provides updates on national security issues, including information threats and counter-disinformation strategies. S <u>https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/</u>

Ukraine's Strategic Communication Efforts An analysis of Ukraine's approach to strategic communications and counterdisinformation, highlighting lessons applicable to Europe and beyond. <u>approach-to-strategic-communications-and-counterdisinformation-lessons-for-europe-and-beyond</u>

Insights on Disinformation Across Platforms Telegram's Role in Disinformation Explores how Russian propaganda operates on Telegram, particularly in occupied territories. <u>https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/stories/disinformation-on-telegram-</u> <u>how-russian-propaganda-works-in-temporarily-occupied-territories/</u> TikTok and the Spread of Russian Disinformation Investigates how TikTok's algorithm has been exploited to disseminate Russian propaganda to millions. <u>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67687449</u>

Al Tools for Detecting and Mitigating Disinformation RAND Corporation – Tools That Fight Disinformation Online A compilation of tools and games designed to educate users about disinformation techniques and how to counter them. <u>https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fighting-disinformation/search.html</u>

Blackbird.Al – Narrative & Risk Intelligence Platform An Al-powered platform that analyzes narratives and detects disinformation campaigns across various media. Shifting https://blackbird.ai/

OSAVUL 🔗 https://www.osavul.cloud/

#### Let's Data 🔗 <u>https://letsdata.net/</u>

RAND Report on Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation A case study highlighting Ukraine's strategies in countering disinformation and the lessons that can be applied elsewhere. <u>https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA2771-</u>
<u>1.html</u>

### Contact details:

ann.mysyshyn@gmail.com

anna.mysyshyn@instingov.org



Linkedin: Anna Mysyshyn, Ph.D



Facebook: Anna Mysyshyn